Introduction
* It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome.-This situation is common in insurance, labor contracting, and the delegation of decisionmaking responsibility, to give a few examples. In these instances Pareto-optimal risk sharing is generally precluded, because it will not induce proper incentives for taking correct actions. Instead, only a second-best solution, which trades off some of the risk-sharing benefits for provision of incentives, can be achieved.
The source of this moral hazard or incentive problem is an asymmetry of information among individuals that results because individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon. A natural remedy to the problem is to invest resources into monitoring of actions and use this information in the contract. In simple situations complete monitoring may be possible, in which case a first-best solution (entailing optimal risk sharing) can be achieved by employing a forcing contract that penalizes dysfunctional behavior. Generally, however, full observation of actions is either impossible or prohibitively costly. In such situations interest centers around the use of imperfect estimators of actions in contracting. Casual observation indicates that imperfect information is extensively used in practice to alleviate moral hazard, for instance in the supervision of employees or in various forms of managerial accounting.
A natural question then arises: when can imperfect information about actions be used to improve on a contract which initially is based on the payoff alone? Secondly, how should such additional information be used optimally?
A recent interesting paper by Harris and Raviv (1976) addresses these questions in the context of a principal-agent relationship in which the agent provides a productive input (e.g., effort) that cannot be observed by the principal directly.2 Their results relate to a very specific kind of imperfect monitoring of the agent's action. They study monitors which provide information that is independent of the state of nature and allows the principal to detect any shirking by the agent with positive probability. Such monitors are of limited interest, however, since they are essentially equivalent to observing the agent's action directly, because a first-best solution can be approximated arbitrarily closely in this case.3 Clearly, one cannot expect imperfect monitoring to possess such strong characteristics in general.
Employing a different problem formulation from Harris and Raviv's, we are able to simplify their analysis and generalize their results substantially. Both questions posed above are given complete answers (in our particular model). It is shown that any additional information about the agent's action, however imperfect, can be used to improve the welfare of both the principal and the agent. This result, which formalizes earlier references to the value of monitoring in agency relationships (Stiglitz, 1975; Williamson, 1975) , serves to explain the extensive use of imperfect information in contracting. Furthermore, we characterize optimal contracts based on such imperfect information in a way which yields considerable insight into the complex structure of actual contracts.
The formulation we use is an extension of that introduced by Mirrlees (1974 Mirrlees ( , 1976 . We start by presenting a slightly modified version of Mirrlees' model (Section 2), along with some improved statements about the nature of optimal contracts when the payoff alone is observed. In Section 3 a detour is made to show how these results can be applied to prove the optimality of deductibles in accident insurance when moral hazard is present. Section 4 gives the characterization of the optimal use of imperfect information and Section 5 presents the result when imperfect information is valuable. Up to this point homogeneous beliefs are assumed, but in Section 6 this assumption is relaxed to the extent that we allow the agent to be more informed at the time he chooses his action. The analysis is brief, but indicates that qualitatively the same results obtain as for the case with homogeneous beliefs. Section 7 contains a summary and points out some directions for further research.
Optimal sharing rules when the payoff alone is observed

A
We study a principal-agent relationship, where the agent privately takes an action a E A C R, A being the set of all possible actions, and a together with a random state of nature 0, determines a monetary outcome or payoffx = x(a, 0). The problem is to determine how this payoff should be shared optimally between the principal and the agent. The principal's utility function is G(w), defined over wealth alone, and the agent's utility function is H(w,a), defined over wealth and action. The model is further restricted by assuming that H(w,a) = U(w) -V(a), with V' > 0 and Xa , 0.4 The interpretation is that a is a productive input with direct disutility for the agent and this creates an inherent difference in objectives between the principal and the agent. It is convenient to think of a as effort and this term will be used interchangeably with action. Since the problem of moral hazard can be avoided when the agent is risk-neutral (Harris and Raviv, 1976), we shall assume U" < 0. The principal may or may not be riskneutral, i.e., G" -0.
In this section, we consider the case where the principal observes only the outcome x. Thus, sharing rules have to be functions of x alone. Let s(x) denote the share of x that goes to the agent and r(x) = x -s(x) denote the share that goes to the principal. It is assumed that both parties agree on the probability distribution of 0 and that the agent chooses a before 0 is known.5 In this case (constrained) Pareto-optimal sharing rules s(x) are generated by the program:
a E argmax E{H(s(x),a')},
a't" where the notation "argmax" denotes the set of arguments that maximize the objective function that follows.6 Constraint (2) guarantees the agent a minimum expected utility (attained via a market or negotiation process). Constraint (3) reflects the restriction that the principal can observe x but not a. If he also could observe a, a forcing contract could be used to guarantee that the agent selects a proper action even when s(x) is chosen to solve (1)-(2) ignoring (3). The latter we will refer to as thefirstbest solution, which entails optimal risk sharing. It differs in general from the solution of (1) subject to (2) and (3), which we call a second-best solution.
Two approaches can be used to solve the program above. The earlier one, used by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), and Harris and Raviv (1976), recognizes explicitly the dependence of x on a and 0, so that the expectations in (1)-(3) are taken with respect to the distribution of 0. They proceed to characterize an optimal solution by replacing (3) with the first-order constraint E{H, s sxa + H2} = 0, and then apply the calculus of variations.
To validate these steps one has to assume that an optimum exists and is differentiable. However, as an example by Mirrlees (1974) shows, there may commonly exist no optimal solution among the class of unbounded sharing rules, and for this reason s(x) has to be restricted to a finite interval in general. As a result, the solution will become nondifferentiable and the above-mentioned approach can no longer be applied.7 I Subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to corresponding variables. 5This assumption corresponds to model 1 in Harris and Raviv (1976) , which is the model they use for studying imperfect information. We shall relax it in Section 6. 6 As usual, E denotes the expectation operator. Since E{H(s(x),a)} need not be concave in a, there may exist multiple solutions, hence the inclusion symbol.
7Even when an optimal solution exists among unbounded sharing rules, it may be nondifferentiable. This has been observed by Gjesdal (1976). To illustrate his ideas one can look at the follow-A better approach to solving (1)-(3), which also gives a more intuitive characterization of an optimum, has been introduced by Mirrlees (1974 Mirrlees ( , 1976 . He suppresses 0 and views x as a random variable with a distribution F(x,a), parameterized by the agent's action. Given a distribution of 0, F(x, a) is simply the distribution induced on x via the relationship x = x(a, 0).8 It is easy to see that xa > 0 implies Fa(X, a) -0. It will be assumed that for every q, Fa(x, a) < 0 for some x-values, so that a change in a has a nontrivial effect on the distribution of x. In particular, it will shift the distribution of x to the right in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
For the moment, assume F has a density function f(x, a) with fa and faa well defined for all (x, a).9 Replacing (3) with a first-order constraint yields the program: 13 It is worthwhile stressing the difference between Corollary 2 and the example in footnote 7. A first-best solution can be achieved in that example because fa does not exist at the endpoints of the uniform distribution. Whenever fa exists, Corollary 2 indicates that a first-best solution cannot be achieved. Also, note that V' > 0 is essential. The role played by V in the characterization is obscured by the complexity of the relationships between (6)-(8), but generally one expects that the larger V' is, the smaller is ,t and the accompanying welfare loss. At an extreme, if V' = 0 for a ' a and V' = oo for a > a then the first-best outcome can be achieved since it entails a = a, which the agent will choose given an optimal risk-sharing rule.
The characterization in (7) has an intuitive interpretation in terms of deviating from optimal risk sharing to provide incentives for increased effort on the part of the agent. This is accomplished by taking s(x) > SA(X) when the marginal return from effort is positive to the agent, and s(x) < SA(X) when it is negative (see Corollary 1). The incentive effect of deviating from optimal risk sharing is stronger the larger is Ifa , and it is more costly (in terms of lost risk-sharing benefits) the greater isf. Thus I fa I If may be interpreted as a benefitcost ratio for deviation from optimal risk sharing, and (7) states that such deviations should be made in proportion to this ratio, with individual risk aversion taken into account.
In contrast to perfect risk sharing, the second-best solution is crucially dependent on the distribution of x and its functional relation to a. This occurs because the outcome x can be used as a signal about the action which is not directly observed. We note thatfa/f is the derivative of the maximum likelihood function logf, when a is viewed as an unknown parameter. In this sense fa/f measures how strongly one is inclined to infer from x that the agent did not take the assumed action, and (7) says that penalties or bonuses (as expressed by deviations from first-best risk sharing) should be paid in proportion to this measure. 14 The deviation from perfect risk sharing implies that the agent is forced to carry excess responsibility for the outcome and this points to the implicit costs involved in contracting under imperfect information (Corollary 2). Consequently, there are positive gains to observing the agent's action, since in that case a first-best solution can be achieved by using a forcing contract. This provides the basis for discussing ways to realize part of these gains by using imperfect monitoring, which is the subject of Sections 4 and 5.
To illustrate the formula in (7) and the interpretations, consider the following example: G(w) = w, U(w) = 2VNw, V(a) = a2, x exp (1/a). In this example, the agent could be a machine repairman, whose effort a will determine the expected time before the machine will break down. The monetary return x is proportional to the length of time the machine will remain operative; (here the proportionality factor has been taken = 1). From (7), the optimal share is:15 s(x)=LA +,u ( a)1 (10) and some simple calculations yield ,u = a3, and the equation 4a3 + 2X -a = 1 for a (using (6) and (8) 15 This is an exceptional example in that no bounds need to be imposed on the sharing rule, and an explicit solution can thus be obtained. 16 In this example the question of uniqueness, referred to in footnote 11, is no problem. For any fixed a, (10) gives the appropriate solution to (4)-(6), which is a relaxation of (1)-(3) when a is fixed at its optimal value. But it is easily checked that s(x) in (10) makes (6) strictly concave in a, and hence the relaxed problem also solves the original one. 
Deductibles in insurance
* The characterization in (7) can be applied to the insurance setting to conclude that optimal accident insurance policies necessarily entail deductibles in the presence of moral hazard. To demonstrate this, the assumption that the distribution F(x,a) possesses a density function will be relaxed. Since (7) is derived via point-wise optimization, a mixture of a continuous and discrete distribution can be used as well, provided the support of the discrete distribution is left unchanged by the action (cf. footnote 7). In that case simply interpret f(x,a) in (7) as the probability mass rather than the value of the density function whenever x is a mass point (and correspondingly forfa andfaa, which both are assumed to exist as before). Mixed distributions are characteristic in accident insurance. First, there is a probability that no accident occurs and this generates a mass point at x = 0; and conditional on an accident, there is a damage distribution overx < 0, which usually can be assumed continuous. If a represents a precautionary action, it is natural to assume that this mixed distribution satisfies: fa(0,a) > ?,fa(x,a) <0.
This assumption says that the probability of an accident decreases with a so that each outcome x < 0 is less likely. For instance, driving a car more carefully will presumably decrease the probability of both small and large accidents. Because ,t > 0 and the left-hand side in (7) is continuous, (11) To summarize the discussion we have:
Proposition 2. Given the assumptions in (1 1), optimal accident insurance policies entail a deductible. If the insured's action only affects the probability of an accident but not the size of damage and the insurance company is risk-neutral, a deductible alone is optimal. This proposition lends additional support to the frequent use of deductibles in accident insurance. However, the reasoning is quite different from that behind the well-known proposition by Arrow (1970), which holds that pure deductibles are always optimal. Arrow does not consider moral hazard aspects, and in his case deductibles arise for instance if the firm uses loading to determine the premium (Mossin, 1968).
Optimal sharing rules based on additional information
* One of the main conclusions from Section 2 is that the optimal solution under moral hazard is not first-best and, hence, that there would be gains to observing the agent's action (see Corollary 2 and the subsequent discussion). Since perfect observation of the agent's action is generally precluded, interest centers on the use of imperfect information for improvements of the contract. This issue can be studied using a straightforward extension of the model in Section 2.
Lety be a signal (possibly vector-valued), which in addition tox, is observed by both parties and hence can be used in constructing the sharing rule. Let F(x,y, a) be the joint distribution of x and-y given a. As in Section 3, letf(x,y, a) be either the value of the density function of the continuous part of F or the probability mass of the mass point (x,y), if such exists. As before,fa andfaa are assumed to exist. The following extension of (7) Again ,u > 0 follows as in Proposition 1, and consequently the secondbest solution s(x,y) will be strictly worse than a first-best solution.18 The interpretation offa/f in Section 2 can be repeated for (13). A new, important feature, however, is thatfa(x,y,a)/f (x,y,a) may change withy. Thus, for the same value of x, but under different contingencies signalled by y, the agent should generally receive different remuneration. In particular, if for one value of y it is possible to infer less about a via x, then the deviation from optimal risk sharing should be smaller, and vice versa. At an extreme, a realization of the signal y could be such thatfa(x,y ,a) 0 for all x (which means that nothing about the action can be inferred from the payoff), and in this case the optimal risk-sharing rule should be employed. In sharecropping, for example, if a natural disaster destroys the crop, farm workers should not be held responsible for the outcome (beyond optimal risk sharing). This is quite intuitive and corresponds well with observed practice. Equation (13) would predict that contracts are elaborate and contain a variety of provisions for unexpected events. Certainly, there is substantial empirical support for this conclusion. Contracts, at least between external parties, tend to be detailed, spelling out different responsibilities in different contingencies (e.g., strikes, accidents, natural disasters, etc.). Not doing so would be inefficient and add to the implicit costs of contracting. In the same way managers are not held responsible for events one can observe are outside their control, and implicitly at least, their performance is always judged against information about what should be achievable given, say, the current economic situation.19
To illustrate the point we can look at an extension of the example in Section 2. Suppose now that the machine can also break down because of a failure in a component over which the repairman has no control. Let this event have an exponential probability distribution with constant parameter (1/k), and assume it is independent of the event that the components which the repairman controls will break down. The latter event still has the same probability distribution as before, namely exponential with parameter (1/a).
If it is not possible to determine whether the failure occurred in a component outside the repairman's control, the optimal solution is to employ a sharing rule:
This follows from (7) 
Value of information
* Before proceeding with a discussion of the value of imperfect information, the notion of a valuable signal needs to be made precise. A signal y is said to be valuable if both the principal and the agent can be made strictly better off with a contract of the form s(x ,y) than they are with a contract of the form s(x). Equation (13) 
f (x,y ,a) for almost every (x,y). The reason is that when (16) holds, a contract s(x) will satisfy (13), whereas if (16) is false, it must necessarily take the form s(x,y). We shall prove this proposition formally below as it is the main result of the paper and no proof of (13) The conclusion that a noninformative signal will have no value may not be surprising (even if our terminology is chosen to make this statement appear more obvious than it is). Basically, it tells us that pure randomization does not pay. The more important part of the proposition is the result that any informative signal, regardless of how noisy it is, will have positive value (if costlessly obtained and administered into the contract). As in Harris and Raviv (1978), one might conjecture that in some situations a sufficiently noisy, yet informative, signal would add too much randomness to the contract to be acceptable by riskaverse parties. But as the proof of Proposition 3 indicates, since both parties are on the margin risk-neutral towards randomness in y, given x, the new contract can be designed so that marginally it does not increase risk, but still improves incentives for action.23 Alternatively, equation (13) This signal is a conditional information system, where resources are invested to find out y only if the outcome is sufficiently bad (below x). It is readily seen that A is also informative and, depending on the costs of obtaining y, the net benefits of using y may exceed those of y 24 Conditional information systems are widely used in practice, which indicates that their cost savings are often sufficient to cover the information loss they engender.
Finally, one can construct an informative signal from y by simply deciding randomly whether or not to find out y.25 Again, this would save costs and is quite effective, particularly if y is a very precise signal about a . 26 The last two examples bring attention to the fact that Proposition 3 says nothing about how valuable y is, which would be important whenever costs for information acquisition and administration of more complex contracts are con- Some indications of the value of the signal can be found by studying (13). Roughly speaking, the more variation a signal causes infaif, the more valuable it will be. This seems difficult to formalize, and I believe that on a general level signals can only be compared by using Blackwell's notion of fineness (see Blackwell (1951) and also remark 4 above).
6. Asymmetric information * In many respects the model we have analyzed is very primitive. One unrealistic feature is the assumption that the agent chooses his action having the same information as the principal, that is, before anything about 0 is revealed. Commonly this will not be the case. After the sharing rule is fixed, the agent will often learn something new about the difficulty of his task or the environment in which it is to be performed. The following extension of our model applies to such cases.27
Let z be a signal about 0 which the agent observes prior to choosing a, so that his choice becomes a function a(z). As before, we suppress 0 and write f (x ,y, z, a) for the joint density function, where y is some additional information observed by both parties. The best sharing rule s(x,y) can be determined by solving the program: 
For the sufficiency part of the proposition, an additional but insignificant qualification is needed. When (26) is false, that is, wheny is informative,fa/f will depend on y as before. Yet, when integrating as in (25), it is conceivable that the right-hand side of (25) would become independent of y, making a function s(x) optimal and y valueless. However, this is extremely unlikely and will not happen generically; any small change in the problem data would take us out of such a situation. Thus, we can safely say that for all that matters, Proposition 3 is also valid in the asymmetric case.
7. Concluding remarks * We have studied efficient contractual agreements in a principal-agent relationship under various assumptions about what can be observed, and hence contracted upon, by both parties. When the payoff alone is observable, optimal contracts will be second-best owing to a problem of moral hazard. By creating additional information systems (as in cost accounting, for instance), or by using other available information about the agent's action or the state of nature, contracts can generally be improved. A simple necessary and sufficient condition for such imperfect information to be of value was given as well as a characterization of optimal contracts which use such information. Principal-agent relationships are prevalent in economic organizations. The analysis presented here improves our understanding of the functioning of this basic organizational form. In view of our result that essentially any imperfect information about actions or states of nature28 can be used to improve contracts, we have an explanation of the observed complexity of real contracts (as evidenced for instance in insurance arrangements). Additional information is of value because it allows a more accurate judgment of the performance of the agent; or viewed differently, it provides the same incentives for effort with less loss of risk-sharing benefits.
Our analysis also provides a basis for studying the design of contracts and information systems in more specific contexts. An application of this kind has recently been given by Baron and De Bondt (1978) Of course, the analysis presented here leaves unanswered many interesting questions in contracting. One important aspect of the problem, which we have not considered, is that many contracts are based on long-term relationships. When the same situation repeats itself over time, the effects of uncertainty tend to be reduced and dysfunctional behavior is more accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard. Such long-term effects could be analyzed in an extension of our model. Another extension would recognize that asymmetry of information as discussed in Section 6 may warrant a renegotiation of the contract. One can view management by objectives and the New Soviet Incentive Scheme (Weitzman, 1976) as examples of this. In both cases, after observing the difficulty of his task, the agent can change the contract within certain limits to the benefit of both parties. A preliminary discussion of this kind of contracting is given in Holmstrbm (1977), where it is seen as a special case of delegation of decisionmaking responsibility to an agent with superior information.
